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On July 15, 2016, a faction of the Turkish army, allegedly linked to the Fethullah Gülen movement, 
executed a plot to overthrow the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) government by creating a chaotic 
environment through coercive means (e.g., closing the main transportation routes, bombing the parliament 
and presidential buildings, shooting down a military helicopter, and taking the Turkish military chief 
hostage). Although the coup attempt was short-lived, both the conventional and digital media played a vital 
role in the event. Indeed, Esen and Gumuscu (2017) contend that the plotters’ inability to secure hegemony 
over the media paved the way for their failure. CNN-Turk—a mainstream TV channel during the coup attempt 
and later acquired by a pro-government conglomerate in May 2018—gave President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
much-needed airtime to reach out to different segments of the public. Nevertheless, Ünver and Alassaad 
(2016) assert that Erdoğan’s TV appearances played only a belated role, and the authors offer empirical 
evidence of an organic mobilization driven by seemingly unrelated social media campaigns and prayers 
broadcast by mosques.3 Meanwhile, both moderate (i.e., Hürriyet) and oppositional print media outlets (i.e., 
Sözcü and Cumhuriyet) were united in their opposition to the coup attempt (Way, Karanfil, & Erçiftçi, 2018). 
 
Various studies (Hallin, 1986; Robinson, 2001; Schudson, 2003) have suggested that during and 
following catastrophic events, the media may enter a period of homogenized reporting in which coverage 
gravitates toward a focal point as they mimic the government’s stance on issues and try to appeal to 
unassailable national (or religious) values.4 Robinson’s (2001) policy-media interaction model asserts that 
when elite consensus exists on an issue, journalists are unlikely to take a critical stance. Schudson (2003) 
emphasizes that, in moments of public danger, journalists trade professional objectivity for obeisance to shared 
values and shared assumptions. Thus, focusing on post–September 11 journalism, Schudson portrays 
journalists as communicators of shared feelings, trying to invoke a generalized “we.” On the other hand, Lang 
and Lang (1980) argue that the media can become a battlefield for contending perspectives and sometimes 
play an active role in the dispute. The July 15 coup attempt in Turkey presents an intriguing case of this type. 
By analyzing the Turkish media’s response to the attempted coup, this article examines how a highly polarized 
media system with organic ties to different sociopolitical camps responds to a catastrophic event under a 
“competitive authoritarian regime” (cf. Esen & Gumuscu, 2016, 2017; Özbudun, 2015).5 
 
 
                                               
3 According to Konda (2016), 84% of the mobilized anti-coup protesters were AK Party voters. 
4 The concept of catastrophe is discussed in more detail later in the article. The coup attempt qualifies as a 
catastrophic event because it sent a shock wave through the system and substantially disrupted social and 
political life. Events of this scale force media outlets to abandon their routines to provide coverage of the events. 
5 As a hybrid regime type, competitive authoritarianism has features of both democracy and 
authoritarianism. It is democratic in the sense that democratic institutions serve as the principal means to 
gain power. However, due to abuse of state and media resources, violations of civil liberties, and fraud 
setting the playing field, it is not fully democratic. On the other hand, such regimes are competitive because 
democratic institutions (e.g., independent media) are not solely a facade. Indeed, opposition parties utilize 
them to compete for power, but they are handicapped by a highly unfair or even dangerous playing field. 
For example, they are frequently confronted or threatened with (tax) fines, attacks, suspensions, and lack 
of advertisements (Levitsky & Way, 2010). 
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This article continues with a discussion of the formation of consensus spheres following catastrophic 
events, drawing on Hallin’s (1986) original theory and subsequent revisions (e.g., Hallin & Mancini, 2004, 
2012).6 We then contextualize the Turkish media system and the questions it poses. After describing the 
contextual and theoretical framework, we present our content analysis of media coverage after the failed 
coup attempt. Finally, we discuss the implications for a broader understanding of how different media 
systems respond to specific developments. 
 
Sphere of Consensus: A Necessary Evil? 
 
Hallin’s (1986) original “spheres of opinion” categorization aimed at establishing a theory of media 
objectivity. Hallin proposed that the collective output of a given media system can be described in terms of 
three concentric spheres, delineated by how the system makes editorial choices in reporting the news. The 
outer “sphere of deviance” represents the area of excluded views that are believed to be outside the 
boundaries of normative behavior. A middle “sphere of legitimate controversy” is a province in which 
journalists promote pluralistic debates while striving for objectivity in a relatively balanced fashion. The 
innermost “sphere of consensus” represents news reporting practices that do not feel compelled to present 
opposing ideas (Hallin, 1986, pp. 116‒117). 
 
According to Watkins (2001), the “sphere of consensus” type of reporting occurs during moments 
of celebration, mourning, or crisis. The literature reveals that during catastrophic events (e.g., war, 
terrorism, natural disasters, and accidents) in which the metanarrative shifts toward complicity in a 
consensus, journalists not only summon the generalized “we” and supposedly shared national values 
(Durham, 2008) but also replicate policy makers’ normative themes (e.g., Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 
2008; Edelman, 1993; Hallin, 1986; Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeaux, & Garland, 2004). As Chadwick 
(2001) notes, politicians’ constant need for media opportunities to maintain their positions of power becomes 
even sharper during crises. 
 
The media is an important institution for helping the state enforce its aims, presence, and legitimacy 
(Edelman, 1993). Therefore, in a crisis, it becomes difficult for media outlets to perform their watchdog role by 
challenging those in power against abuses and informing public. As the “uncertain guardians” (Sparrow, 1999), 
particularly in catastrophic times, media outlets’ motivations are shaped by various material pressures (i.e., 
political and economic) and normative considerations (i.e., journalistic ethics such as adherence to objectivity). 
This is especially so in a polarized media system like Turkey’s, where media outlets gravitate toward the 
ideologies of their affiliated sociopolitical groups and become increasingly partisan. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6 Due to shortcomings and methodological problems in their application to the non-Western context, Hallin and 
Mancini’s four dimensions and three models have faced various criticisms. These led Hallin and Mancini (2012) 
to compile a book to discuss non-Western media systems. Despite the shortcomings, however, many scholars 
continue to employ these dimensions in various ways and for various purposes (Hallin & Mancini, 2017). 
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Turkey’s Media System: A Tale of Polarization and Party–Press Parallelism 
 
With its 19th-century Ottoman roots, the Turkish press has always been politically connected (R. Kaya 
& Çakmur, 2010). While the relationship is close and state pressure on critics has always been present, the 
1950s saw the Turkish press industrialize rapidly to become a relatively rich media environment by the 1980s 
(Adakli, 2009; A. Kaya, 1999). This transformation involved shifts in ownership from a newspaper traditionally 
owned by its editor in chief to one owned by capital with investments in other business sectors, such as energy, 
construction, and finance (Kejanlıoğlu, 2004). By the late 1990s, the system had become oligopolistic (Bıçakçı 
& Hürmeriç, 2014), with most influential media groups having organic ties to banking, petrochemicals, and 
construction. This context fits with Hallin and Mancini’s (2012) definition of a polarized/pluralist media system, 
where the state both directly and indirectly dominates the media landscape. Governments, political parties, and 
industrialists with political allegiances have profound power over Turkey’s media, so most journalists behave 
more like political activists than professional journalists. Consequently, commentary-oriented and advocacy 
journalism is common. However, during the 1990s, the Turkish media landscape was not particularly polarized 
while frequent government changes and coalitions limited the political parties’ direct influence on coverage. 
 
Given this background, Turkey’s conservative/Islamist media is particularly interesting. Once on the 
periphery of the media landscape, those news outlets have gained a significant share and now enjoy a privileged 
status (Rethink Institute, 2014). Because the circulation rates of dailies (e.g., Yeni Şafak, Yeni Akit, and Milli 
Gazete) are not economically viable, these outlets are either sponsored by conservative/Islamist business groups 
(e.g., Albayrak Media Group for Yeni Şafak) or various Islamist religious groups to disseminate their ideology. 
Unsurprisingly, they maintain a mostly pro–AK Party stance (Bulut & Karlidag, 2016; R. Kaya & Çakmur, 2010; 
Media Ownership Monitor Turkey, 2018; Toruk & Olkun, 2014). Because the AK Party has favored the 
development of a pro-government media landscape, particularly since 2007, the boundaries between media 
outlets that were previously classified as mainstream (Çarkoğlu, Baruh, & Yıldırım, 2014; R. Kaya & Çakmur, 
2010) and conservative/Islamist have become increasingly blurred. 
 
The Turkish media sector is peculiar in the sense that it serves as a venue for business owners to do 
favors for governments—not the other way around—to become successful in other sectors (Buğra & Savaşkan, 
2014, pp. 158‒162). That is, since the Turkish government plays a critical role in the economy (e.g., through 
various regulatory amendments, arbitrary tender criteria changes for major infrastructure projects, and tax 
fines/evasions), knowledge of the media tycoons’ nonmedia business activities can help us understand media 
outlets’ framing differences. For example, leaving aside their concern for sales and advertising revenues (since 
the state/government is the principal advertiser; Sözeri, 2015) (see Table 1), the owners of Sabah and Hürriyet 
would hesitate to report news that might jeopardize their relations with the government, perhaps even opting 
to take a clear pro-government stance. Unsurprisingly, therefore, some evaluated the Turkish state’s imposition 
of the heaviest tax fine ever on Doğan Group—the owner of Hürriyet, which has the highest circulation—as the 
Erdoğan-led AK Party’s punishment for severing its ties (“Dogan v Erdogan,” 2009). Overall, the Turkish media 
system faces constant economic (through owners’ industrial and commercial commitments) and political 
pressure to moderate its coverage. 
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Table 1. Newspaper, Circulation, Ownership, Other Business Interests, 
and Coverage Style in 2016. 
Newspaper 
Circulation 
rank Ownership 
Nonmedia 
business 
activities 
Coverage 
style 
Digital 
performance 
regarding 
page views 
and daily 
visitors 
Top 10 
(online) 
media 
outlet 
ranking for 
“providing 
accurate 
and reliable 
news” 
Hürriyet 1 Doğan Groupa Energy, retail, 
industry, 
tourism 
Moderate 8 5 
Sabah 2 Zirve Holding 
(Kalyon Group)b 
Construction, 
energy, 
transportation 
Pro–status 
quo/pro–
incumbent 
AK Party 
government 
7  
Sözcü 3 Burak Akbay 
(Estetik 
Publishing Joint 
Stock 
Company) 
 Oppositional 21 1 
Cumhuriyet 19 Cumhuriyet 
Foundation-
Yenigün News 
Agency Press 
and Publishing 
Joint Stock 
Company 
 Oppositional 47 9 
 
Note. Data are compiled from Çarkoğlu et al. (2014); Panayırcı, İşeri, & Şekercioğlu (2016); Sözeri (2015); 
Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (2016); Alexa (2016); Medyatava (2016); Yanatma (2017); and Media 
Ownership Monitor Turkey (2018). 
a The acquisition of Dogan Media Group (including Hürriyet) by Demirören Holding, a pro-government 
conglomerate loyal to President Erdogan, was finalized on May 21, 2018 (“Turkish Media Group,” 2018). 
b In 2008, Çalık Group, a conglomerate close to the AK Party, acquired Sabah (and the ATV TV channel) 
from Turkey’s Savings Deposit Insurance Fund. This move was interpreted as Erdoğan’s attempt to establish 
his own media outlet (Esendemir, 2008; Mavioğlu, 2012). In December 2013, the pro–Erdogan/AK Party 
Kalyon Group bought Sabah (and ATV) from Çalık Group. This news outlet is known for acting as an AK 
Party mouthpiece (Media Ownership Monitor Turkey, 2018). 
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One group that particularly experiences this pressure is the pro-Kurdish media. Turkey’s Kurdish 
minority has faced identity problems since the foundation of the Turkish Republic (Yeğen, 2015). Several Kurdish 
political parties have been closed, and southeast Turkey (where the population is predominantly Kurdish) was 
under a state of emergency for 25 years until 2002. Unsurprisingly, pro-Kurdish media outlets with ties to ethnic 
Kurdish nationalism have also faced pressure, with most being temporarily closed during those years (Moustakis 
& Chaudhuri, 2005). Nonetheless, Aydin and Emrence (2016) contend that, due to the AK Party government’s 
instrumentalist Kurdish policy, pro-Kurdish media experienced fewer problems from 2002 to 2014. However, 
since 2015, and especially following the coup attempt, most pro-Kurdish media, such as Azadiye Welat, Özgür 
Gündem, and IMC TV have been ordered to close (“Turkish Authorities,” 2016). 
 
As Akin (2017) notes, access to “healthy” news became rather complex after the coup attempt. 
Polarization was inevitable given that Turkey’s sociopolitical camps made every effort to disseminate their 
narrative, ranging from government-guided “screened publics” choreographed to the media’s needs (Carney, 
2019) to Gülenists trying to purify themselves by disclosing past activities (Bulut & Can, 2019). In his analysis 
of Turkish media outlets’ frame adoption strategies, Oz (2016) finds a clear pro- and anti-government divide in 
the Turkish media system. By the time of the failed coup attempt of 2016, the media was already highly 
polarized, with high levels of party–press parallelism, which made it markedly more difficult for the system to 
follow an extended period of consensus. 
 
 
The Turkish Media’s Trial With the Catastrophic Coup Attempt 
 
Despite its failure, the coup attempt was catastrophic in severely disrupting the population (the death 
toll reached 237, including 34 coup plotters, while 2,191 people were injured), government functions, and 
national morale. Beyond its immediate impact on Turkish society, the event prompted the Turkish president to 
declare a three-month state of emergency on July 21, 2016, allowing rule by decree without the two largest 
opposition parties’ parliamentary approval (Republican People’s Party, or CHP, and Peoples’ Democratic Party). 
This decree was later extended several times by the AK Party and its ally, the Nationalist Party.7 From the very 
beginning, the government accused Gülenist elements in the Turkish armed forces of plotting the coup. The 
decree decisions enabled a “post-coup massive purge” (Keyman, 2017, p. 456) whereby more than 100,000 
public servants were dismissed, hundreds of civilian institutions were closed (including nongovernmental 
organizations, media outlets, and universities), and politicians were arrested or detained (including the pro-
Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party co-leader Selahattin Demirtaş). At the time of writing, more than 150 
journalists and media workers had also been arrested, including the editor in chief of Cumhuriyet, Murat 
Sabuncu, accused of having links to the Gülen movement (Amnesty International, 2018; Arslan, 2017; Human 
Rights Watch, 2017). Some scholars have interpreted these state-of-emergency measures as the last step of 
the AK Party’s increasingly authoritarian policies to eliminate all groups opposing its rule (Başer & Öztürk, 2017). 
 
 
 
                                               
7 The state of emergency continued for two years before ending on July 18, 2018. 
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Considering these characteristics of the event and its aftermath, this study investigates the coup 
attempt as a case to comparatively analyze the news coverage of Turkey’s high-circulation print media outlets 
affiliated with contending sociopolitical camps (pro–AK Party, moderate, oppositional).8 As noted in the 
introduction, various academic studies have revealed the polarized pluralist characteristics of Turkey’s media 
system. Thus, we predict that the system will struggle to achieve a sphere of consensus, as proposed in the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H1: The consensus sphere will be limited, if it exists at all, to a shallow anti-coup sentiment while coverage 
of the coup attempt and government responses will remain polarized. 
 
H2: Media coverage of the coup attempt and the government’s responses will reflect existing lines of 
political polarization between sociopolitical camps. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8 The historical roots of these sociopolitical divisions go back to the late Ottoman/early Republican era. Since 
then, the conflict between the Westernizing/modernizing secular elites (i.e., Young Turks, Republican 
Kemalist cadres) and the rest of Turkey’s traditional ethnic/religious population has been considered “the 
most important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics,” conceptualized as “the center-periphery” 
(Mardin, 1973, p. 170). This is not to argue that this divide is the only cleavage, as Mardin describes it as a 
tentative theoretical proposal and confesses that the reality is much more complex, noting other cleavages 
within the periphery (e.g., between Kurds and Turks; p. 187). Regarding Mardin’s most important cleavage, 
the pro-Western secular center dominated the state apparatus throughout the Republican era. As the 
periphery—representing the traditional and religious segments of society—gained wealth through rapid 
economic modernization, it first penetrated then dominated the center, prompting the prehegemonic rule 
of the pro-periphery AK Party. This transformation prompted an academic debate on whether Mardin’s 
framework can still explain Turkish politics in the new era (Açıkel, 2006; Bakiner, 2018; Wuthrich, 2013). 
Bakiner (2018) has proposed a research agenda to examine microlevel dynamics within and between social 
actors and institutions for cases that contradict Mardin’s binary scheme. Indeed, the AK Party represents 
the emergence of new socioeconomic and political elites that rival and in some ways have transformed 
Turkey’s traditional secular elites (Somer & Liaras, 2010). However, Mardin’s cleavage is not irrelevant for 
explaining current Turkish politics. On the contrary, a new but persistent divide has become apparent, 
namely Kulturkampfs (Kalaycıoğlu, 2012), delineated by the socioculturally liberal and secular coastal 
provinces (mainly represented by CHP) versus the more religiously conservative hinterland (mainly 
represented by the AK Party). Labeled the “new Islamic bourgeoisie” (Yankaya, 2014), the latter’s business 
elite has emerged as significant political actors—such as the owner of Sabah, ATV Broadcasting, and the 
Kalyon construction firm Orhan Cemal Kalyoncu—in the country’s rapidly growing economy, thereby 
becoming integrated into the central distribution of wealth under the “new capitalism in Turkey” (Buğra & 
Savaşkan, 2014, pp. 142‒155). Alarmingly, even for optimists, a 2016 survey, “Dimensions of Polarization 
in Turkey,” revealed a high polarization between the constituencies of different parties, especially between 
the AK Party and CHP (Erdoğan, 2016). 
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Data and Analysis 
 
This study is based on a quantitative content analysis of media coverage of the July 15, 2016, coup 
d’état attempt in Turkey. This event provides an opportunity to explore how national news outlets covered this 
major catastrophic event. The coverage of four national newspapers—Hürriyet (moderate), Sözcü (opposition), 
Cumhuriyet (opposition) and Sabah (pro–AK Party government)—were analyzed for the three-month period 
after the attempt, from July 16 to October 16, 2016. The main criteria for selection were the papers’ affiliation 
with specific sociopolitical camps, circulation rates, online performance, reputation as news sources, and the 
owners’ nonmedia business activities. Cumhuriyet was included because of its deep impact on Turkish political 
history (Aslanbay, 2017), its digital performance, and reliability, despite its low circulation rates (see Table 1). 
 
As previously explained, Turkey’s media system is multifaceted due to the sociopolitical camps 
behind it. This complexity is exacerbated by various identifications and loyalties, including left versus 
right, Turkish nationalism versus Kurdish nationalism, Sunni Islam versus Alevi Islam (see Semerci & 
Erdoğan, 2018; for a comprehensive study of political ideologies in Turkey, see also Bora, 2016). This 
study, however, focuses on another major polarizing sociopolitical cleavage in Turkish society: 
conservatism/Islamism (principally represented by the AK Party) versus secularism/Kemalism 
(principally represented by CHP; Erdoğan, 2016). 
 
Because this study analyzes news outlets’ institutional strategies rather than columnists’ 
personal opinions, the unit of analysis is news articles. Any news article focusing on the coup or that 
cited/quoted relevant political actors was included in the analysis. The front pages of all four newspapers 
were coded for issue frames. In total, 1,829 news articles from 372 daily newspaper issues were 
analyzed. Issue frames were selected as the method of decoding content in preference to coding valence 
(positive-negative) frequency or intensity, or number of mentions of specific terms (party names, leader 
names, etc.) for two reasons. First, although simple mention counts or valence coding may be easier 
and provide more stable measures, they are low in resolution because they do not give a nuanced 
summary of the content analyzed. For the purposes of this study, we needed to not only test whether 
outlets were similar in content choice but also decode differences in terms of content choice. Although 
identifying issue frames is more subjective and a potentially less stable measure, it can provide better 
resolution regarding media outlets’ content choices. Second, as discussed below in some detail, news 
reporting itself is an exercise in framing. Therefore, a measure that can capture these editorial choices 
is necessary to understand the dynamic relationship between sociopolitical context and content choice. 
 
As Patterson (1997) notes, the power of the press stems mainly from the way in which it frames 
situations. Entman’s (2010) framing theory suggests that politicians and journalists promote a particular 
side of the story, thus influencing and hindering each other. The literature on framing theory offers a 
rich spectrum of generic frames that are ubiquitous and applicable to different contexts and issue-
specific frames for particular topics or events. To analyze the media coverage of the failed coup attempt, 
we identified seven frames that were used in at least 10% of the coverage by at least one media outlet 
(see Table 2). 
 
 
1470  Emre Iseri, Eser Şekercioglu, and Ugur Cevdet Panayirci IJoC 13(2019) 
Table 2. Explanations and Examples for Selected News Frames. 
Frame Explanation Example 
Commonality 
Carey (2008) 
Focuses on creating a sense of union 
among the members of a community 
Emphasizes national unity 
Suggests disregarding ideological or racial 
differences 
Depicts shared celebration or mourning 
Provides a human example and associates 
it with loss while mentioning greater good 
“Democracy Gathering” (Sabah, July 
30, 2016) 
“Long-Awaited Scene” (Sözcü, July 
22, 2016) 
Ostracism Counterframe for commonality 
Suggests that society is not unified 
against developments 
Implies that protesters and/or supporters 
of certain political views do not represent 
community at large 
Reflects disagreement between parties 
and social groups 
“The Witch Hunt Begins” (Cumhuriyet, 
July 19, 2016) 
“We Understand Different Things 
From Democracy Gathering” 
(Hürriyet, September 4, 2016) 
Demonization 
(Hutcheson et 
al., 2004) 
Depicts certain individuals/groups as evil 
Contains written or visual information that 
might generate feelings of outrage and 
hate 
“Claims Himself as Spiritual Leader 
[referring to Gülen] and Rips Off the 
State” (Sözcü, August 2, 2016) 
“Traitors That Sold Their Soul for 1 
Dollar” (Sabah, August 31, 2016) 
Attribution of 
responsibility 
(Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 
2000) 
Suggests that some level of government 
can alleviate the problem 
Suggests that some level of government is 
responsible for the issue/problem 
“Government Did Everything It Could 
to Send the Terrorists to the 
Constitutional Court” (Sözcü, July 18, 
2016) 
“May Both God and the People Forgive 
Us” (Hürriyet, August 4, 2016) 
Consequence 
(Neuman, Just, 
& Crigler, 1992; 
Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 
2000). 
References consequences of pursuing a 
course of action 
Mentions political, social, economic 
consequences 
“Treacherous Conversations of Coup 
Plotters” (Cumhuriyet, July 19, 2016) 
“Resignation Order From YÖK to All 
University Deans” (Hürriyet, July 20, 
2016) 
Mythicizing Depicts resistance against the coup 
attempt as epic and heroic endeavors 
“Martyrdom Ring Instead of 
Engagement Ring on July 15” (Sabah, 
July 23, 2016) 
Abuse of power Emphasizes the government’s abuse of 
power 
Focuses on the purge and neutralizing 
anti-government power groups 
“[The purge]Surpasses the Terrorists 
and Turns to Opponents” 
(Cumhuriyet, September 3, 2016) 
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Coding Procedure 
 
To operationalize the news frames, our study draws heavily on measures developed by Semetko 
and Valkenburg (2000). To identify the issue frames, a series of yes/no question items was developed. 
Coders responded to questions about each news article. If at least one question was answered in the 
affirmative for a particular frame (each frame was identified with three to six questions), the article was 
coded in that frame. Each article could be coded into more than one frame or into none of the 12 frames 
identified. Two native Turkish speakers, who were not involved in analyzing the frames, carried out the 
coding procedure. There was 84% agreement among the coders, and intercoder reliability for the frame 
assignments provided a Krippendorff’s alpha of 0.89. Given the high number of frames (12), this agreement 
level was more than acceptable. Subsequently, the articles were assigned to a frame to check whether both 
coders had allocated the article to that particular frame. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
According to Hypothesis 1, there should not be strong consensus in the aftermath of the attempted 
coup, and any consensus that does exist will be limited to a shallow anti-coup sentiment. We also expected 
coverage to remain polarized. The first test of this hypothesis involved total frame usage patterns. In total, 
3,133 frames were identified in 1,829 articles. Table 3 breaks down total frame usage by frame and outlet. 
Although we identified and coded 12 different frames, the news outlets focused on relatively few of these, 
with only seven appearing at least 10% of the time in at least one media outlet. The following tables and 
figures report the results from these seven frames (shaded area in Table 3). 
 
The first evidence supporting Hypothesis 1 can be found with a glance at Table 3. How the four outlets 
framed their coverage varied highly. For example, the pro-government Sabah never used the abuse of power 
frame, whereas Cumhuriyet used it in almost a quarter of its stories (23.47%). Sabah used the commonality 
frame in more than 20% of its coverage, while Cumhuriyet used it less than 4% of reports. Similar contrasts 
can be found elsewhere in Table 3, but it suffices to note that media framing of post-coup coverage showed 
little, if any, convergence toward an official line. Only Sabah, with its emphasis on the commonality, mythicizing, 
and demonization frames (48.74% of its total frame usage), conformed to the government’s attempt to rally 
the people around the AK Party against the alleged perpetrators of the coup. Cumhuriyet remained the most 
critical, emphasizing the ostracism and abuse of power frames (49.3% of total frame usage). 
 
While the overall frame usage patterns indicate a lack of convergence on an official position initially, it 
is possible these newspapers later diverged in their coverage. To test this, we investigated how the use of frames 
changed over time. First, we present the overall temporal pattern in Figure 1. 
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Table 3. Frames Adopted by News Outlets.  
Cumhuriyet Hürriyet Sabah Sözcü 
N % N % N % N % 
Commonality 31 3.85 73 11.07 227 22.4 43 6.55 
Ostracism 208 25.83 36 5.46 1 0.09 73 11.12 
Attribution of 
responsibility 
63 7.82 34 5.15 24 2.36 80 12.19 
Demonization 2 0.24 21 3.18 150 14.8 63 9.6 
Consequence 263 32.67 396 60.09 343 33.85 306 54.15 
Abuse of power 189 23.47 21 3.18 0 0 21 3.2 
Mythicizing 4 0.49 17 2.57 117 11.54 8 1.21 
Naturalization 2 0.24 9 1.39 20 1.97 15 2.29 
Call to action 6 0.74 9 1.39 49 4.83 9 1.59 
Affirmation of 
Republican values 
21 2.6 17 2.57 20 1.97 17 2.59 
World opinion 12 1.49 17 2.57 27 2.66 1 0.15 
Sinister powers 4 0.49 9 1.39 35 3.45 20 3.04 
Total number of 
frames 
805 659 1,013 656 
Note. Gray-shaded frames appear with at least 10% frequency in at least one newspaper.  
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Figure 1. Frame usage by time and media outlet. 
 
If each media outlet maintained a consistent position in the sphere of consensus during the study 
period, we would expect this to be reflected in its frame usage patterns over time. However, Figure 1 clearly 
shows that the four outlets did not converge on a common framing pattern at any time. Therefore, frame 
adaptation needs to be considered in relation to important events during this three-month period. The first 
general decline in use of the commonality frame occurred as early as July 21, after the declaration of a state 
of emergency, which created elite disunity regarding the power balance and the government’s authoritarian 
leanings. As a CHP member bluntly stated, “After the declaration of the state of emergency, polarization 
became a little bit more legal, a little bit more institutionalized” (Aydın-Düzgit & Balta, 2017, p. 10). 
 
On July 24, 2016, during CHP-led demonstrations in Taksim Square, Istanbul, CHP leader Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu declared that coup attempt suspects should be judged fairly. Then, in early August, use of the 
commonality frame increased, mainly due to the Democracy and Martyrs Rally led by President Erdoğan in 
Yenikapı, İstanbul. Cumhuriyet was the only outlet that questioned and criticized the rally for excluding the 
pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (“Kılıçdaroğlu’ndan,”2016). Cumhuriyet also highlighted 
Kılıçdaroğlu’s rally speech on the importance of democracy and the rule of law and a reference to separation 
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of powers and media freedom. While the ISIS terrorist attack on August 21 at a wedding ceremony in 
Turkey’s southeastern province of Gaziantep affected the agenda, Sabah and Sözcü instrumentalized this 
incident by equating the Fethullah Gülen Terror Organization (FETO)9 with ISIS (“FETO, PKK, ISIS: You 
Become the Mastermind’s Pawn,” Sözcü, August 22, 2016; “You Will Not Succeed, There Is No Difference 
Between FETO, PKK, ISIS,” Sabah, August 22, 2016). 
 
During late August, Hürriyet and Cumhuriyet focused on the start of the Euphrates Shield military 
campaign in Syria on August 25 and the terrorist attack claimed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) near 
the town of Cizre in southeast Turkey on August 27 and devoted less coverage to the coup attempt. 
Cumhuriyet’s preferred frame of coup coverage was ostracism, with 26.88% of all frame usage. In the last 
week of August 2016, this percentage temporarily dropped to 8.21%. After these shocks, starting in 
September, Cumhuriyet intensified its use of the ostracism frame. Between September 1 and October 14, 
the use of the ostracism frame increased to 32.86%. Similarly, Hürriyet, which until late August 
demonstrated a relatively balanced use of frames, used no (0%) ostracism, commonality, or attribution of 
responsibility frames between August 25 and September 1. In contrast, the coup attempt still dominated 
coverage in Sabah and Sözcü. In fact, those two outlets continued to cover coup-related news throughout 
the analysis period. As shown in Figure 1, both Sabah and Sözcü continued to employ the demonization 
frame in depicting the Fethullah Gülen movement. Even after a car bomb attack in southeast Turkey that 
killed 18 people and wounded 26 (BBC, 2016), Sabah chose to headline FETO-related news (“That’s How 
FETO Got Hold of the Universities,” July 10, 2016, Sabah) rather than the bombing, limiting its coverage to 
a smaller article (“Treachery in Şemdinli,” July 10, 2016, Sabah), while all the other outlets headlined the 
bombing. 
 
 
The only striking commonality in the frame usage patterns was that all four outlets heavily used 
the consequences frame (albeit with variations). However, the very nature of the consequences frame leads 
us to expect that a certain proportion of media coverage in any given context would be framed as 
consequences of the events. This finding is in accordance with Houston, Pfefferbaum, and Rosenholtz’s 
(2012) contention that disaster news largely concerns what is happening at that moment. Of the news 
outlets investigated here, the moderate Hürriyet relied most on the neutral issue frame. 
 
Hypothesis 2 proposes a differentiation between media outlets in the framing of their coverage. We 
went one step further to predict that frame usage would not only differ but also reflect the existing 
sociopolitical connections of each media outlet. That is, we predicted that a catastrophic event might fail to 
instigate consensus, partly because existing allegiances would create strong path dependencies from the 
expectations of a highly polarized readership and because of political and economic constraints. A first probe 
into this hypothesis is provided in Figure 2. 
 
                                               
9 FETO (Fethullah Terrorist Organization) is a term coined after the coup attempt to refer to the Fethullah 
Gülen movement, the alleged perpetrator. 
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Figure 2. Overall frame usage by outlet (%). 
 
 
Having discovered no significant convergence of coverage following the coup attempt, in what ways 
did the coverage of the four outlets differ? Figure 2 reveals several interesting patterns. First, as noted 
earlier, Sabah relied on three frames other than consequences: commonality, mythicizing, and 
demonization. As the flagship pro-government media daily, this was not unexpected. During and 
immediately after the coup attempt, the government tried to rally the public around the AK Party and its de 
facto leader, President Erdoğan (with the constitutional amendments become de jure later). Sabah’s 
coverage reflected support for this effort through a focus on national identity, the shared struggle against 
the perpetrators (commonality), vilification of Gülenist movement members (demonization), and stories of 
the heroism and martyrdom of the people who opposed the coup attempt on the streets (mythicizing). In 
contrast, through its focus on the ostracism and abuse of power frames, the opposition-supporting 
Cumhuriyet emphasized how the government had turned the coup attempt into a purge of the opposition. 
Hürriyet, as a mainstream moderate outlet, unsurprisingly stayed relatively clear of those frames that 
implied a strong affinity with any sociopolitical camp. This perhaps explains why around two-thirds of all its 
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coverage employed the consequences frame. Hürriyet also refrained from employing the potentially 
galvanizing frames of ostracism and abuse of power. These patterns of issue framing are in line with what 
we know about these outlets in terms of their recent leanings (Çarkoğlu et al., 2014; Panayırcı et al., 2016). 
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show how the coverage changed over time for the commonality, ostracism, and abuse 
of power frames. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. News outlets’ use of the commonality frame, July 16–October 15, 2016 
. 
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Figure 4. News outlets’ use of the ostracism frame, July 16–October 15, 2016. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. News outlets’ use of the abuse of power frame, July 16–October 15, 2016. 
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The time series shown in Figures 3, 4, and 5 indicate that differences between the outlets persisted 
over time despite sizable fluctuations. The pro–AK Party Sabah tended to use the commonality and 
demonization frames more than other news outlets both in terms of frequency and percentage. This is what 
one would expect since, based on previous studies of the Turkish media (Bardakçı, 2013; Çarkoğlu et al., 
2014; Panayırcı et al., 2016), Sabah is closely affiliated with the AK Party government. Strikingly, however, 
other outlets refrained from embracing the commonality frame, with Hürriyet and Sözcü using it infrequently 
and then stopping completely within two months of the incident. As for Cumhuriyet, its adoption of the 
commonality framework was mostly limited to reporting on the speeches of political actors. Thus, Turkish 
news outlets not directly affiliated with the government had reservations about using the commonality 
frame, which is the main indicator of a consensus sphere. They did not fully support the government’s 
depiction of social reality; in fact, by employing the ostracism and abuse of power frames, these news 
outlets created their own symbolic representations of the event. Even from the early days after the coup 
attempt, Cumhuriyet refused to use the commonality frame and instead embraced the ostracism frame. 
 
Based on these findings, we can conclude that there was no meaningful convergence toward a 
sphere of consensus, even when it was the government’s top priority. This is due to the Turkish media 
system being an increasingly polarized pluralist system. While an attempted coup, at face value, is a severe 
and catastrophic political event, a closer look reveals an alternative, perhaps more nuanced interpretation. 
From the very beginning, the coup attempt was branded by the government as being perpetrated by Gülenist 
elements within the Turkish armed forces. This characterization, while largely perceived to be true, is 
problematic in two ways. First, the ruling AK Party’s relations with Fethullah Gülen’s Hizmet movement had 
already become a major polarizing influence in the Turkish media. This issue became salient during the 
political scandal caused by the December 17, 2013, corruption probe against several AK Party government 
ministers and their sons. Differentiation in the Turkish media over the scandal stemmed mainly from their 
affiliations with contending sociopolitical camps (e.g., the pro–AK Party Sabah versus the pro-Gülen 
movement Zaman; Panayırcı et al., 2016).10 As former allies, the AK Party and the Gülenists had neutralized 
the Kemalist military factions within the Turkish armed forces. However, their marriage of convenience 
ended and they began to perceive each other as the main threat, culminating in the coup attempt (Şık, 
2014; Taş, 2018). 
 
This situation created the possibility that the coup attempt could be perceived and portrayed as a 
power struggle between two pro-Islamist political camps, thereby making it more difficult for those media 
outlets associated with the opposition (in our case, Sözcü and Cumhuriyet) to converge with pro-government 
outlets (e.g., Sabah). Second, if the coup attempt is perceived as a struggle for dominance between two 
domestic actors, it becomes more difficult to cultivate a common in-group versus out-group dynamic, thus 
making it less likely for outlets to adopt a consensual stance around a common foe and/or common values. 
Hence, we can argue that the correlation between a catastrophic event and the emergence of a consensus 
sphere is context dependent or media system bound rather than generalizable. 
 
 
 
                                               
10 On July 27, 2016, Zaman daily was shut down due to its alleged links to Gülenists. 
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Conclusion 
 
This study investigates the factors shaping news media objectivity and consensus in Turkey as a 
polarized media system. Our investigation of media responses to the coup attempt of July 15, 2016, forms 
a case for why media systems as polarized and parallelized as the Turkish media system may experience 
greater difficulty transitioning to a sphere of consensus following catastrophic events. In a complex 
sociopolitical landscape with numerous forces influencing political events, it is always possible to find at 
least anecdotal evidence for nearly any narrative. Therefore, our goal was not to offer a speculative narrative 
but rather to delineate testable expectations considering the theoretical implications of a polarized media 
system operating during and after a catastrophic event. The existing literature fails to provide answers for 
why news outlets have difficulty falling into consensus in catastrophic times. Our study allows us to offer 
some suggestions concerning the possible underlying tendencies regarding this seeming dissensus. 
 
In analyzing media responses to the failed coup attempt, we distinguished between the systemic 
and contextual factors that determined the reactions of media actors. Systemic factors are derived from the 
characteristics of the media system that shape and constrain the media outlets’ coverage choices. In 
particular, it is riskier for a media outlet to fall into the sphere of consensus if it is not confident that either 
its core audience or economic and political patrons expect such a consensus. To investigate this issue, we 
explored contextual factors and how they interact with systemic factors. Contextual factors include the 
effects of the sociopolitical context and the characteristics of the catastrophic event. In well-studied 
examples of consensus-inducing events, two characteristics come to the fore. First, the source of the crisis 
or catastrophe can be traced to (or at least blamed on) an outside force, thus activating a Manichean binary 
opposition between good and evil, in-group and outgroup, friend and enemy, or us and them (Kellner, 2004, 
p. 47). Second, the target or the influenced group is perceived to be society at large or the nation rather 
than a specific subgroup that might have a polarizing or divisive influence (Durham, 2008). Most mainstream 
media outlets neither anticipated backlash from their audience nor had to contend with political overlords 
due to parallelism. In other words, contextual factors and systemic factors did not interfere with the process 
of consensus formation. Yet can we expect this always to be the case? Based on our findings, we propose 
three requirements for consensus formation in a polarized media system. 
 
First, the severity of the event or change must be great enough to bridge the peaks in the bi- or 
multipolar sociopolitical landscape. An attack from an outside source that can easily be identified and vilified 
will help this process. One might think that an attempted military coup might help as well, but the view 
becomes more nuanced when we consider the source and target of the attempted coup and how these 
actors relate to the sources of polarization and parallelization in the media system. 
 
Second, the out-group identity of the source or perpetrator must be easily established. In a 
polarized system, this requirement limits the possibilities of converging on a common enemy that is an 
outside source. Catastrophic events that can be blamed on a domestic political actor are also likely to widen 
the fault lines along which public opinion and the media are polarized. In a highly polarized system, a 
catastrophic event might even exacerbate rather than suspend existing polarization. 
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Third, the narrower the target population is, the less likely a sphere of consensus is to be formed. 
If the intended target or the segment of the society that is anticipated to be affected by the catastrophic 
event is perceived to belong primarily to one particular sociopolitical camp, or if the event is conceptualized 
as a conflict between two sociopolitical camps, then a sphere of consensus might be unachievable. Here, 
the polarization and/or fragmentation of the system plays a dual role. On the one hand, sustained exposure 
to polarized coverage reinforces the contrast between in-group and out-group, making an us-versus-them 
interpretation more accessible. On the other hand, the polarized media might perceive political pressure to 
emphasize the viewpoint of its parent sociopolitical camp, thus creating a centrifugal force away from 
consensus. 
 
Our study is a baseline for examining the state of the media landscape in Turkey’s competitive 
authoritarian regime. The article reveals that, even during a catastrophic event, news outlets failed to 
cultivate a landscape where issues are debated and probed in order to provide the public with validated 
facts and multiple sides of a story to uphold democracy. Considering “the authoritarian turn” of Turkish 
policy makers outlined above, and its interaction with the global rise of the “new authoritarianism,”11 one 
could argue that this growing authoritarian environment has polarized the Turkish media landscape to such 
an alarming degree that a sphere of dissensus has become the modus operandi. Arguably, this high level of 
media polarization and partisan journalism contributes to the survival of authoritarian regimes since it makes 
them immune from internal criticism and the opposing sociopolitical camps’ discourses (cf. McCoy, Rahman, 
& Somer, 2018). If so, the state of dissensus in the Turkish media at the time of the catastrophic coup 
attempt was not an isolated development but should be read as a specific case that could take place in other 
countries that are turning authoritarian with polarized media landscapes. Therefore, we recommend that 
cross-country comparative studies be conducted to examine the correlation between the type of media 
system and authoritarian turn. 
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